CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this report we have raised problems with the HACAS feasibility study and with the associated studies, as we are aware of them. We have tried to seat this analysis within a wider literature and to incorporate the information and opinions we have gained by talking to a variety of actors and players in the delivery of housing services. There are appear to be a number of major conclusions, though by their nature these are tentative as local and central government have been reluctant to release many of their assumptions, reasonings and detailed workings into the public domain. Briefly, we believe that the proposed whole stock transfer is based on the need to circumvent the Treasury rules. Without the perverse use of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) rather than the General Government Financial Deficit(GGFD), the investment in public corporations could proceed to the benefit of tenants, council taxpayers and the existing workforce.

Even given these limitations, the preferred option of the HACAS consultants appears to be based on some dubious assumptions. These are sufficiently significant to raise criticisms over the whole report and to question those parts of the studies to which we have been denied access. It does seem clear from our reading of their findings that the proposal favours an optimistic conclusion. Change some of these elements and the benefits of stock transfer are much diminished.

Any other study should use more realistic assumptions and so should present an even less favourable position on transfer. In particular, any attempt to break up the stock into a series of CBOs will impose costs on the tenants, workers and taxpayers that seem unjustified apart from ideology alone. Without parallel and consistent transfer of the DLO to a housing stock body there will be massive disruption to employment, training and services. The much claimed benefits of 4000 new jobs, itself a dubious figure, would not compensate for this.

We believe there is sufficient in this report to criticise the Glasgow City Council approach, the apparent Scottish Executive preferred option, and the likely outcomes of the stock transfer steering group.

What is required are: an open and transparent debate with full access to all relevant figures, assumptions and reasonings; a concerted campaign to change the Treasury definition of borrowings from PSBR to GGFD; an appreciation of the exemplary efforts of the Council staff in employment and training, in delivering services to the homeless and those on housing benefit, but also a realisation that this has been underfunded partly because of the debt burden; and a campaign to alter internal management practices.
The proposed stock transfer is bad for tenants, for council taxpayers and for the Scottish community as a whole. It offers an expensive option to solving Glasgow's housing crisis. The Scottish Executive should be convinced of the need to relieve the debt burden by writing off the debt, by allowing the creation of a housing quasi-corporation, and by working in partnership with tenants and unions.

The option we recommend you explore further is:
Local Housing Quasi-Corporation
This would ring-fence the housing account within the local authority.
It could borrow money based on an effective business plan and on the regular income and asset base of the housing stock, but with no recourse to the general assets of the authority.
This is the cheapest alternative funding solution for investment.
Residents would benefit from capital investment without the uncertainties of a new landlord.
The local authority would retain ownership, control, and retain its own nomination/
allocation policies.
This is the only option which guarantees the retention of jobs, incomes and training
opportunities for the existing workforce.
The existing debt should be written-off by the Scottish Executive, or central government, effectively taking it over.

It is in line with best value practice, and would allow improvements in management and closer tenant involvement in an environment of co-operation, trust, security.

Tenants should retain their security tenancies and other rights.

Although the borrowing would be included in the PSBR measure of public indebtedness it would be excluded from the GGFD definition. Campaigning for a change in definition from PSBR to GGFD would favour this scheme and bring Britain into line with the rest of Europe.

There would be guaranteed benefits for tenants, Glasgow council taxpayers and Scottish taxpayers.
The promotion of integrated, community based regeneration policies would be enhanced.